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Abstract
The link between consumer credit markets and bankruptcy policy is a complex one,
acknowledged but not adequately examined in the existing scholarship. This essay argues that
the causative relationships running between borrowing and bankruptcy compel a different
strategy for policing the conduct of lenders and borrowers in consumer credit markets.
I begin by sorting out some of the realities of consumer lending that policy debates about
bankruptcy “reform” have obscured. First, I discuss the empirical link between credit card use,
on the one hand, and increased consumer spending and financial distress. That link suggests that
the ability of transacting parties to externalize the costs of financial distress contributes to the
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steadily increasing use of credit cards. Second, I argue that there is no evidence that the relatively
liberal discharge available in the United States has led to abusive borrowing and spending. Third,
I discuss the evidence that suggests that a more accessible bankruptcy discharge relates to an
increase in entrepreneurial activity, with the associated positive spillover effects.
The essay then turns to consumer credit regulation. Generally, it argues that usury
reforms have only a limited prospect for success, largely because of their inability to distinguish
between value-increasing and value-decreasing transactions. Thus, I argue instead for two
alternate approaches. The first would be to impose mandatory minimum payments on credit card
contracts. Experience in the market suggests, albeit tentatively, that this will cause some
marginal reduction in the amount of borrowing and lead to faster termination of open-ended
borrowing contracts by those most likely to default. The best approach, I argue, would be a tax
on distressed debt, particularly defaulted credit-card debt, which would have the salutary effect of
internalizing some of the costs of those transactions on a party well placed to limit their
occurrence.
Finally, the essay turns to bankruptcy theory. Here, the essay challenges the assumption
of existing work that the purpose of bankruptcy policy should be to alter the incentives of
borrowers to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy. Rather, I contend, the task is to allocate the
losses between borrowers and lenders in a way that minimizes the net externalized costs of
financial distress. Generally, I argue that this calls for rules placing more risks on lenders, so that
they will have an incentive to use the information technology at their disposal to limit the costs of
distress. The specific legal rule I recommend to further that end would be to subordinate the
bankruptcy recoveries of adjusting, controlling creditors (credit-card lenders in the modern
American example). I close by comparing the implications of my analysis with a few of the most
salient provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which are
largely inconsistent with the concerns I raise.
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OPTIMIZING CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETS
AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not novel to claim an inextricable link between consumer credit markets and
bankruptcy policy. It is, still, a challenge to understand the nature of the link and the
implications it holds for policymakers. Each of the many perspectives from which that
link can be examined suggests something different. For example, prominent economic
analysts have explored the likelihood that expansion of the bankruptcy discharge can both
increase the demand for credit and decrease the supply.1 Parallel work has considered the
effect of bankruptcy exemptions on the supply and demand for credit.2 An important
problem for either analysis, underscored by Tom Jackson, has been the likelihood that
quasi-rational behavioral biases of consumers undermine the policy prescriptions one
might draw from models focused on fully rational consumer actors.3
Historical and political economic perspectives, in contrast, focus on the possibility
that the expansion of the supply of credit necessitates a broader discharge. For example,
several writers have pointed out the progression from relaxation of consumer credit
regulations in much of western Europe in the 1980s, to increased financial distress by

1

Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. Legal Stud. 585 (2000).
2

Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in the U.S. (unpublished 2005
manuscript) [hereinafter White, Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit]; Michelle J. White, A General
Model of Personal Bankruptcy: Insurance, Work Effort, Opportunism and the Efficiency of the
‘Fresh Start’ (unpublished 2005 manuscript) [hereinafter, White, A General Model].
3

(1985).

Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393
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consumers, and finally to the adoption of bankruptcy systems that offer an increasingly
more accessible discharge.4 Viewing the relaxation of consumer credit regulations as an
aspect of globalization, the comparative literature resonates with the political economy
literature about globalization.

Writers in that vein consistently have argued that

globalizing economies must provide some form of relief (here, the bankruptcy discharge)
for those that bear the adverse effects of the unforgiving competitive markets that
globalization induces (here, those who borrow to the point of financial distress).5 Indeed,
the United States appears to be unique in responding to rising levels of credit-induced
financial distress with a harshening of the bankruptcy process.6
In truth, however, the link is considerably more complex than existing analyses
suggest. For example, to take a complexity that is a prominent theme in this essay, data
and policy about consumer credit blend two markets with distinct macroeconomic

4

Jason Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 Nw. J.
Int’l L. & Bus. 257 (2004) [hereinafter Kilborn, German Approach]; Jason Kilborn, Continuity,
Change, and Innovation in Emerging Consumer Bankruptcy Systems: Belgium and Luxembourg
(unpublished 2005 manuscript) [hereinafter Kilborn, Belgium and Luxembourg]; Jason Kilborn,
La Responsabilisation de l’Economie: What the U.S. Can Learn from the New French Law on
Consumer Overindebtedness, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 619 (2005) [hereinafter Kilborn, New French
Law]; Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Changing Directions in Consumer Bankruptcy Law and
Practice in Europe and USA, 20 J. Consumer Pol’y 133 (1997); Jay Westbrook, Local Legal
Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 American Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 25 (1998); Teresa Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class (2000).
5

Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists (2003)
(asserting that thesis). Mark Roe has made the most detailed explication of this point in the legal
context. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1998); Mark J. Roe, Political
Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact (2003).
6

The most telling example is the recent Enterprise Act of 2002, which recently lowered
the discharge period in the UK from three years to one year. Insolvency Act 1986 § 279 (as
amended by Enterprise Act 2002 § 256). I should not make too much of this point, because in
many respects the American system still could be viewed as one of the most, if not the most,
lenient. From that perspective, some (though certainly not I) might argue that the comparative
trends reflect convergence on an ideal system.

2
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implications and justifications. On the one hand, a dominating motivation for opening
consumer credit markets often is the hope that an increase in consumer credit will jumpstart spending and thus lead to overall growth of the economy.7 At the same time,
concerns about entrepreneurialism and the importance of fostering innovation have
focused on providing a credible promise of a discharge to failed entrepreneurs.8 Previous
academic analyses of credit policy have not focused on the difficulties of untangling the
separate effects of entrepreneurial and consumer lending on credit and bankruptcy policy.
II. CAUSATION, CONSUMER CREDIT, AND BANKRUPTCY
It is easier to understand that there is a link between consumer credit and
bankruptcy than it is to understand what that link is. To say anything informative about

7

The most noted example is South Korea. See Ronald J. Mann, Global Credit Card Use
and Debt: Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses (unpublished April 2005 manuscript)
[hereinafter Mann, Global Cards Policy]. However, the policy intuition is widely followed. For
example, in the United States, consumer spending represents about 70% of the GDP. U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product First Quarter
Thus,
2005, available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/gdp105a.pdf.
substantial increases in consumer spending thus should directly cause an increase in GDP. The
basic premise of current Federal Reserve policymaking is that reductions of interest rates will
lead directly to increased consumer spending, and thus an increase in GDP. The academic
literature strongly supports the idea that loosening of credit constraints can increase personal
consumption, but is much more ambiguous on the relation between personal consumption and
real economic growth. E.g., Philippe Bacchette & Stefan Gerlach, Consumption and Credit
Constraints: International Evidence, 40 J. Monetary Econ. 207 (1997); Sydney Ludvigson,
Consumption and Credit: A Model of Time-Varying Liquidity Constraints, 81 Rev. Econ. Stat.
434 (1999).
8

Bruce Mann’s historical work shows that this impulse has a lengthy pedigree in this
country. Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American
Independence (2002). John Armour’s recent empirical work suggests that the rigor of the
discharge has a substantial effect on entrepreneurial activity. John Armour, Personal Insolvency
Law and the Demand for Venture Capital, 5 Eur. Bus. Org’n L. Rev. 87 (2004) John Armour &
Douglas J. Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship (unpublished 2005 manuscript),
available at www.bepress.com. For more general theoretical discussions of the relation between
bankruptcy policy and productivity, see Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76
Am. Bankr. L.J. 81 (2002); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37
Wake Forest L. Rev. 51 (2002); Richard Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU
L. Rev. 127; Richard Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 Ill. L. Rev. 301.

3
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the policy implications of the interaction, it is necessary to develop some factual premises
about how one affects the other. Thus, it requires some factual understanding of the
causative effects that run from credit to bankruptcy and from bankruptcy to credit.
A.

From Borrowing to Bankruptcy
At first glance, it seems odd to ask whether borrowing causes bankruptcy. Of

course it does. How easy is it to become bankrupt without debt? The point here,
however, is to understand what that relation is. The fundamental problem with the
existing literature is that it ignores the unusual trifurcated structure of credit card
transactions (with separate points of agreement, purchase and borrowing). My related
research suggests that those transactions generate externalities.9 In particular, that work
shows a substantial link between consumer credit behavior and bankruptcy, starting from
market imperfections and behavioral biases that cause consumers to borrow imprudently,
and leading to excessive levels of financial distress.
Starting with the structure of the transaction, the separation of three points in the
credit card lending transaction obscures the borrower’s ability to assess the relative risks
and returns of the transaction. The first is the time of the account opening – when the
contract that will govern the borrowing is made. This point has little significance to the
overall transaction, because the borrower has not made a decision to use the card.10 The

9

Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy (unpublished March
2005 manuscript) [hereinafter Mann, Cards Data].
10

The problem is exacerbated by the dynamics of credit card contracting. Thus, even if it
were rational for a borrower to study the contract (which it typically is not), and even if the
borrower evaluated the contract with perfect rationality (which also would be atypical), it would
be difficult for the borrower to price the particular contracting and repayment terms, given the
likelihood that the lender would reserve the right to change those terms at any time and apply the
changed terms to outstanding borrowings.

4
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second point is the time of the purchase – when the decision to spend is made. The third
point is the time of the monthly bill – when the decision to borrow is made. In that
model, the crucial decision point is deferred at least to the point of purchase. Because of
those problems, it is difficult to countenance the assumption of contracting decisions that
rationally assess the risks and rewards of a particular borrowing transaction – the general
foundation of the economic literature on consumer credit. That assumption does not map
in any plausible way to the transactional structure of the dominant retail payment system
in the American economy.
The empirical evidence is telling. Among other things, the available evidence
indicates that increases in consumer credit correlate with increases in consumer
bankruptcy. More pointedly, the evidence indicates that credit card debt correlates with
subsequent increases in consumer bankruptcy, even when overall borrowing is held
constant. Therefore, in a country in which the level of overall consumer borrowing
remains constant, the evidence indicates that an increase of about $100 per capita in
annual credit card debt is associated with an increase in bankruptcy filings two years later
of about 200/million.11
The problem would raise relatively little social concern if borrowers and lenders
were the only ones affected by excessive borrowing. It might reflect a value transfer
from consumer borrowers to lenders, or a diversion of consumer resources toward the

11

Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9. To be sure, we cannot be certain in the abstract that
an increase in distress is suboptimal. Surely even a well-ordered economy, with an optimal level
of risk-taking, would include some amount of financial distress. It is thus empirically debatable
whether any particular economy has excessive levels of distress. For purposes of this paper,
however, I generally accept the implicit view of the existing literature that the level of financial
distress in the United States economy currently is excessive.

5
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repayment of loans and away from investment or spending. Indirect effects such as
those, however, would not motivate broad policy responses. In fact, however, consumer
credit contracts generate substantial externalities, at least when they lead to financial
distress. There are the costs of unpaid loans to other creditors – costs that are particularly
serious as a policy matter when they are borne by nonadjusting creditors that have not
priced into their dealings the likelihood that the bankrupt consumer will fail to repay.12
There are the losses to the economy of the diminished productivity of those in financial
distress, a problem that is exacerbated if financial distress is likely to lead to such
problems as a decline in mental and physical health.13 There are the costs to others in the
family of the distressed borrower; children and spouses suffer substantially in the event
of financial distress of a wage-earning spouse.14 Collectively, those costs suggest a
substantial external cost of consumer financial distress. Coupled with the evidence of a
direct causative link between borrowing and bankruptcy, there is good reason to attend to
that link when designing optimal regulatory policies for consumer credit markets and
bankruptcy systems.
B.

From Bankruptcy to Borrowing
The converse question is the extent to which the existence of the bankruptcy

system influences borrowing in the economy. On that point, for example, the dominant

12

We know little about the prevalence of nonadjusting creditors in consumer bankruptcy
cases. For evidence from business cases, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Contracting
out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (2005).
13

Melissa Jacoby argues that it does. Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence
Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 560 (2002).
14

Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why MiddleClass Mothers and Fathers Are Broke (2003); Christopher L. Peterson, Taming the Sharks:
Towards a Cure for the High Cost Credit Market (2004).

6
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models of consumer credit markets show how in a world populated by omnicompetent
and wholly rational actors a loosening of bankruptcy standards – to make bankruptcy less
rigorous or more readily available – would lead to an increased demand for borrowing.
The central concern of those models is how to resolve the problem of moral hazard.
Thus, they reason, rules that permit borrowers to display their repayment proclivities by
accepting such remedies as arm-breaking are important to allow signaling to prevent
markets from unraveling as more and more borrowers succumb to the moral hazard.15
More pointedly for policy purposes, many writers in the populist vein emphasize the
possibility that a loosening of the rigors of bankruptcy might lead to opportunistic
borrowing. Thus, those writers contend that consumers often borrow because they know
that bankruptcy will forgive their obligation to repay the loan.16
What we know about the reality of bankruptcy makes it difficult to credit that link
as a sufficiently important pattern of real-world behavior to give it an important role in
shaping policy. First, the existing literature includes a rich series of research projects
designed to collect evidence about the nature of the people that file for consumer
bankruptcy in this country. Although that literature is nuanced and does not always
provide robust conclusions,17 it does plainly suggest that the overwhelming majority of

15

Adler, Polak and Schwartz, supra note 1; Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer
Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 Econ. Inquiry 188 (1984).
16

E.g., Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L.
Rev. 177; Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis Nw. U. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2005); Todd J. Zywicki, Testimony Presented to the Judiciary Committee of
the United States on Bankruptcy Reform (Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter, Zywicki, Testimony].
17

It is not clear, for example, whether older people suffer more or less in bankruptcy than
younger people.

7
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people that file for consumer bankruptcy in this country are in deep financial distress.18
Thus, that evidence suggests that the abusive and highly compensated filer seeking to
discharge luxurious consumer spending is largely a myth.19 Surely, there are abusive
cases, but there is little reason to think that those cases are sufficiently frequent to
undermine the need for a broad discharge.
We also now have empirical evidence from a comparative study of consumer
credit, credit card debt, and consumer bankruptcy in about two-thirds of the world creditcard market.20 If the opportunistic story were correct, we would see a steep rise in credit
card debt shortly before bankruptcy – in the six months immediately preceding the
bankruptcy. Thus, as bankruptcy grew closer, the causal connection between increases in
credit card borrowing would grow more significant and display a substantially higher
coefficient. As it happens, however, the evidence is contrary to that understanding.
Rather, the evidence suggests that the relation between increases in borrowing and
consumer bankruptcy plays out over a long period – suggesting a slow pattern of
consumers borrowing ever farther beyond their means so that their financial position is so

18

Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors
(1989); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 4; David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren,
Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy, Health Affairs, February 2005; Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne, Going Broke
and Staying Broke: The Realities of the Fresh Start in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies (unpublished 2005
manuscript).
19

Lynn LoPucki provides a contrary account based on his experiences as a lawyer in
consumer bankruptcy cases. See Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 461
(1997). The experiences he recounts, however, are difficult to reconcile with the empirical
evidence with which I am familiar. There is some possibility that the reality of the system has
changed since his experiences in practice, which admittedly did not extend into the period traced
by the recent empirical evidence that Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook emphasize.
20

Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9.
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fragile that they are unable to withstand the typical misfortunes that are so common in
our globalized economy.21
To me, the most intriguing aspect of the empirical evidence is the evidence
suggesting a distinct pattern for entrepreneurial borrowing. To the extent there is any
relevant data, the data suggest that a robust bankruptcy discharge is associated with a
valuable increase in entrepreneurial risk-taking, which is likely to create positive
spillover effects. Thus, for example, Rafael Efrat has argued as a comparative matter that
countries without strong safety nets that wish to support entrepreneurial innovation are
driven to provide lenient discharges.

More recently, John Armour has provided a

fascinating empirical test, which suggests that the leniency of the bankruptcy discharge
can be associated with measures of the level of entrepreneurial risk-taking – venturecapital investment activity and self-employment, in particular.22 Similarly, Michelle
White recently has presented data suggesting that increases in property exemption levels
help to foster small-business formation by providing a form of implicit wealth
insurance.23 In a related paper, using plausible values for the level of opportunistic
activity in existing debt markets, her models indicate that the optimal bankruptcy system
would have a substantial and nonwaivable postbankruptcy income exemption –
something much like Chapter 7 of the existing Bankruptcy Code.24

21

Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9.

22

See Armour, supra note 8; Armour & Cumming, supra note 8.

23

See Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of
Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & Econ. 543 (2003).
24

See White, Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit, supra note 2.

9
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There is a distinct but related question about the relation between bankruptcy
policy and bankruptcy rates. Although we would expect that a bankruptcy system that
provides more relief would lead to more filings than one that provides less relief, we
know little empirically about the fine details of that point. For example, although the
Japanese are thought by some to be the most culturally averse to bankruptcy,25 the
Japanese bankruptcy filing rates are now higher than those in Australia and about the
same as those in Canada, apparently in response to the recently adopted Westernized
consumer bankruptcy system. The extent to which the higher filings rest on the new
system, as opposed to cultural or institutional factors is an important one, but one that
could not be resolved without detailed statistical analysis that has not yet been undertaken
in any country.
For example, evidence from Canada tends to suggest that debt levels have been
much more important in the level of filings than anything else. Diane Ellis points out that
bankruptcy filings in Canada rose quite rapidly after Visa entered the market; she
pointedly compares that fact to the similar rise in filings here shortly after the
deregulation of credit card interest rates. Her point is that the increased filing rates in this
country are more likely attributable to higher credit card debt than to the major changes
in US bankruptcy law at about the same time.26

25

See Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 Boston College Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 1 (2005)),
26

Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card
Volumes, Charge-offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, Bank Trends 98-05 (FDIC, Div. of
Ins., Mar. 1998). I discount the argument of Buckley, supra note 30, because his comparative
econometric analysis of the causes of USA and Canadian bankruptcy filings includes no data on
debt levels in the two countries.

10
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One of the hardest problems is that it is hard to define “leniency” in this context.
Thus, people commonly characterize the American consumer bankruptcy system as the
most lenient, based on the immediate discharge that it offers. But when we add means
testing, broaden the categories of debts that are not dischargeable, and increase the period
between permitted filings (as in the United States), it becomes less clear that the practical
effect of the system is more hospitable than a simpler system that grants a free and
complete discharge to all after a short waiting period. It is even harder to assess the
effect of the provisions that create administrative hurdles to filing (credit counseling,
increased documentation, and lawyer certifications), which might limit filings by
depriving potential filers of qualified advisers. Thus, we should be cautious in assuming
that we can predict the effects of any particular bankruptcy reform on filing rates.
*****
In sum, the existing evidence strongly suggests that increases in consumer credit
impose substantial subsequent externalities on society, and casts doubt on the gravity of
the concern that lax bankruptcy policy will lead to opportunistic borrowing and a
subsequent unraveling or deterioration of the consumer credit markets. If anything, the
data suggest, particularly with respect to entrepreneurial borrowing, that a loosened
discharge could have positive spillover effects by increasing the demand for activity most
likely to have positive external effects.
C.

A Note on Stigma
Views on the relation between the bankruptcy discharge and consumer economic

activity are closely related to the problem of stigma, which has dominated academic and
political debates about bankruptcy in this country and elsewhere. The critics of the status
11
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quo claim that rising bankruptcy rates reflect a decline in moral fiber, evidenced by an
undue readiness to accept relief in bankruptcy. Thus, the argument goes, there is a direct
causal link between the improved public perception of bankrupts in the last few decades
and the large-scale increase in the number of people who file for bankruptcy.
It is unfortunate that this point is treated as a serious subject for policy debate.
First, as noted above, the empirical data that we have on this question points in one
direction. Most filers in this country are in situations of such extreme distress that it is
not plausible to view bankruptcy as a planning tool for them. Indeed, it is unlikely that
any particular feature of the legal system (beyond the availability of an automatic stay)
would have a notable effect on their decision to file. In other words, it is as likely as not
that those individuals would file even under a much more onerous system. Efforts to
make the system less accessible only increase the costs to those filers and to the taxpayers
that fund the system.
Related to that point is the reality that only a small portion of the individuals who
efficiently could file choose to do so.27 Because it is quite difficult to collect datasets of
people that have not filed for bankruptcy that are in financial circumstances comparable
to those that do file, we know little or nothing about precisely what motivates the
particular individuals that file to do so. Without that knowledge, it is difficult to credit
the simplistic notion that lack of stigma generally is what is motivating them. If the

27

See Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at
Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Laws and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 685
(1998) [hereinafter White, Why It Pays]; Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for
Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org’n 205 (1998) [hereinafter White, Why Don’t More Households
File?].

12
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decline in stigma is a general societal problem, why doesn’t stigma motivate the millions
of other similarly situated nonfilers?
Third, the studies that have suggested that a decline in “stigma” has accounted for
much of the filing surge since the enactment of the 1978 legislation are methodologically
unsound. The general technique of the existing studies is to proceed by the circuitous
route of identifying various other institutional reasons for filing changes, treating
“stigma” as the cause of all remaining unexplained variation in filing rates.28 Others use
crude proxies for strength of social norms (measured, for example, by urban residency,
Catholicism, and age).29
But that methodology even on its own terms cannot possibly identify any share of
filings attributable to a decline in the sense of the filers that their conduct is shameful,
because that methodology cannot disentangle that effect from other closely related
effects. For one thing, the studies could do a much better job of identifying more specific
debt and credit-card related variables. In my related paper, a relatively simple model
with variables for changes in GDP, credit card debt, credit card spending, and consumer
credit can explain about 90% of the variation in bankruptcy filing rates in a dataset of six

28

E.g., David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal
Bankruptcy and Delinquency, 15 Rev. Fin. Stud. 319 (2002).
29

See F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. Legal Stud. 187
(1998). The argument is that correlations between lower bankruptcy filings and greater
population shares of urban residents, Catholics, and the elderly indicate that bankruptcy filings
are a sign of the breakdown of social networks.

13
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different countries. None of the “stigma” literature has included detailed variables to
assess the relation between credit card use and bankruptcy filings.30
More broadly, it is difficult to see how any such study, however carefully
designed, could separate the effect of “stigma” from a “learning-curve” effect associated
with increased awareness of the bankruptcy process. It is plain that consumer bankruptcy
filings increase with increases in consumer debt. As filings increase, the average person
might be more aware of the bankruptcy process and view it more charitably. Some of the
changing view might simply be attributable to an accurate understanding of the process.
Yet at the same time, increased awareness might cause some to fear bankruptcy filing
even more than they did before. More importantly, it is quite difficult to connect the
effects of that increased awareness with actual filing patterns. The increased awareness is
likely to affect a large number of people, of whom only a small number choose to file.
Finally, most fundamentally, the acceptance of a stigma lever as a policy tool has
unpleasant consequences, which seem perverse in light of the sociological literature and
commonsense understandings of the negative effects of stigma.

If we credit the

possibility that even a substantial number of the current bankruptcy filers are forced into
filing by exogenous circumstances that few could surmount, exactly what are we trying to
accomplish by increasing the sense of shame and blameworthiness we wish them to
attach to their actions? Would we deal with the fallout of one-parent households by
increasing the stigma of divorce? As Mark West shows in his discussion of Japanese

30

See Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9. Compare Buckley & Brinig, supra note 29
(expressing doubt that lending variables could explain the variation and noting that they did not
use lending data in their models); F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J.

14
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who use suicide to avoid the shame of financial insolvency, there are ways of responding
to financial distress that have greater social cost than a bankruptcy filing.31

III. REGULATING CONSUMER CREDIT
With that empirical perspective in hand, I turn now to a concrete discussion of the
relevant regulatory problems. When we think about the regulation of consumer credit
markets, we must start with the reality that the majority of credit transactions are valueincreasing transactions for all parties that engage in them. Notwithstanding the relation
between an increase in borrowing and an increase in financial distress, it remains true that
the overwhelming majority of borrowers successfully repay their debts. Lenders in free
markets presumably profit from almost all of those transactions, and borrowers
presumably profit from many of them – they would profit from all of them if it were not
for the likelihood that some borrowing transactions will reflect poor judgment even if the
borrower ultimately obtains the funds to repay the loan.
Moreover, many of those transactions will be valuable not only for the parties that
participate in them. They will generate positive externalities, as the expenditures will
indirectly support the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy. Thus, as a
substantial body of literature suggests, there is in many circumstances a positive relation
between increases in household indebtedness at one point in time and consumer

67 (1994) (econometric model designed to test differences between Canadian and American filing
rates that does not include any data related to debt in the two countries).
31

Mark D. West, Dying to Get out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Suicide in
Japan (unpublished 2003 manuscript).
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expenditures and gross domestic product some years later.32 The goal, then, is to identify
policies that can isolate the transactions most likely to impose costs on the rest of society
and burden those transactions without imposing clogging hurdles on the value-increasing
transactions that reflect the bulk of consumer expenditure and borrowing.
It is likely that some of the instrument-induced risk could be managed through
reforms that shift payment transactions away from credit cards (which have such a strong
connection to financial distress) to other electronic payment systems such as debit
cards.33 It might seem odd to think that a shift from credit cards to debit cards would
have a substantial effect on prodigal expenditure and borrowing, but the existing data
strongly suggests that it does. The correlations between increased credit card use and
increases in consumer credit, for example, largely dissipate if overall plastic-card use is
substituted as the explanatory variable.34 When we recall the reasons for rising debit card
use in the United States – the most plausible explanation being a quasi-rational
precommitment to enforced budgeting35 – that data is easier to understand.

32

E.g., Dean M. Maki, The Growth of Consumer Credit and the Household Debt Service
Burden, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT (Thomas A. Durkin &
Michael E. Staten eds. 2002).
33

See Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7. In that paper I recommend, among
other things, prohibitions on reward programs that offer “cash-back” for credit-card purchases,
rules that ban marketing of credit cards to minors and college students, and so-called “universal
default” contract provisions. I also recommend shifting the existing disclosure system (focused
on the time of contracting) to one more focused on the time of purchase and repayment.
34

Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9.

35

Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9; Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7.
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Still, what we see from the UK – where credit card use as a share of plastic card
use has remained small36 – is that a fully developed economy still can develop a
consumer debt load of troubling proportions.37 Indeed, the UK is not alone. Many of the
countries with the most serious problems with burgeoning consumer credit are not
countries in which the credit card has yet taken hold.38 Thus, although payment systems
reform might do a great deal, especially in countries in which credit cards are dominant,
further steps to control the externalities of excessive borrowing are likely in most cases to
be appropriate.
A.

Usury Regulations
Although it should come as a surprise to those not familiar with the literature, the

most common response to the problem has been to recommend a formal price regulation:
a so-called “usury” statute that would bar transactions above specific prices.39 So, for
example, recent years have seen one version or another of that approach from academics

36

Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7.

37

In the UK, a disproportionately large amount of the debt is in the form of home
mortgages. For general discussion of the problem, see The Griffiths Commission on Personal
Debt, What Price Credit? (2005) [hereinafter Griffiths Commission, 2005 Report].
38

Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7; Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 4;
Kilborn, New French Law, supra note 4; Kilborn, Belgium and Luxembourg, supra note 4; see
also European Card Review, European Payment Cards Yearbook 2005 § 3.2 (explaining that
credit card use in the EU is concentrated in the UK, Ireland, and Turkey, while consumer credit
has risen broadly throughout).
39

There are numerous other possible approaches. The proposed EU Directive, for
example, includes a variety of regulatory approaches that have not yet been tried here, the most
important being requirements that lenders give advice about appropriate products; responsible
lending obligations; and prohibitions on unfair terms being the most important.
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of such widely varying perspectives as Elizabeth Warren, Eric Posner, and Christopher
Peterson.40
As a structural matter, those proposals confront two foundational difficulties. The
first is the acknowledged bluntness of usury as a tool to respond to social problems.41
The different proponents of usury proposals have different concerns. Posner is concerned
about the externalities that risky credit transactions impose through increasing the cost of
the welfare system. Warren is concerned about the likelihood that the lending often
reflects poor judgment on the part of those that engage in it. As discussed above, I am
more concerned about the externalities financial distress creates. In any case, however,
the concern is not simply that the rate is high. The concern is that high interest rates are a
useful proxy for the types of transactions that justify social concern, whatever the specific
basis for that concern.
Thus, any usury limitation necessarily will be both over- and under-inclusive.
Indeed, Posner recognizes this problem specifically.

His model recognizes that the

limitation he proposes would forbid some transactions that in fact are value-increasing –
risky but not prodigal transactions for which a high rate of interest is appropriate – and
permit some transactions that impose externalities – prodigal borrowing that occurs at
rates below the usury cap. Because borrowers and the uses that they make of funds are so
heterogeneous, the bluntness of the tool is a serious problem. If even an omniscient

40

Warren & Tyagi, supra note 14; Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A
Defense of Usury Laws, the Unconscionability Doctrine, and Related Limitations on the Freedom
to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 (1995); Peterson, supra note 14.
41

James J. White, The Usury Trompe L’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000) (making this
point in some detail).
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regulator could not easily define a usury limit that would produce optimal benefits, we
should be reluctant to expect that the conflicting interests that will motivate legislative
action will lead to anything that approximates a plausible level.
The bluntness problem is aggravated by the rapid segmentation of the consumer
borrowing market.

Even fifteen years ago, most credit card issuers charged most

borrowers in their portfolio one of a small number of rates, with very few distinctions
based on the relative creditworthiness of different customers in the portfolio. The lesson
of the last ten years, however, has been that information technology has made it much
easier to loan larger amounts of money more reliably to individuals with less extensive
and less positive credit histories. This has resulted in an increasingly sophisticated
differentiation among borrowers, in which borrowers of different risks pay cognizably
different rates of interest, the kind of segmentation that is highly to be praised in an
assessment of the market.42 Indeed, it is relatively plain that this has led to a decline in
the effective interest rate charged on outstanding credit card debt.43
To be sure, the rate of default on high-interest loans is likely to be higher than the
rate of defaults on a set of loans to persons of uniformly higher creditworthiness. Yet
that says little about whether the transactions are so risky as to justify prohibiting them.
What remains plain is that a usury regulation is not well designed to sort the undesirable
transactions from the desirable ones that increase social wealth.

42

Mark Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure (Fed. Res.
Bank of Philadelphia, Payment Cards Center, Discussion Paper) (January 2003). For similar
analysis of events in the UK and France, see Department of Trade and Industry, The Effect of
Interest Rate Controls in Other Countries (2004) [hereinafter DTI Report].
43

See Figure Two.
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Another major problem that any usury regulation must confront is the distortion it
will impose on the credit market. The discussion above explains why a usury regulation
will impose costs even if borrowers and lenders take no actions to avoid the application
of the regulation. In fact, however, a usury regulation is likely to lead not only to the
suppression of some transactions that impose externalities (the positive aspect of a usury
law), but to the shifting of a substantial portion of the outlawed transactions either to
markets that are beyond the scope of the regulation or to extralegal markets beyond the
scope of any regulation. For one thing, what little evidence we have suggests that the
demand for credit is remarkably stable even across national, cultural, and regulatory
boundaries.44 Therefore, low-income people have similar needs for credit everywhere,
and regulatory constraints will not change that.45 Because in practice usury regulations
apply differentially and haphazardly to the highly segmented menu of consumer credit
products, the potential for shifting among products – which might at first glance seem a
trivial detail – is in fact a serious problem.46
The evidence for this problem is surprisingly varied. In Japan, for example,
restrictions that have prevented banks from issuing revolving credit have led to a
marginal decline in the amount of credit, because the lenders to which the market shifts
are not as well-situated to do this lending as banks (primarily, I believe, because of the

44

See Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7 (discussing relatively uniform levels of
consumer credit in developed countries).
45

DTI Report, supra note 42.

46

See White, supra note 41.
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information banks have about their depositary customers).47 Nevertheless, it is also fair
to think that those regulations have led to a much larger shift in lending to relatively
unregulated non-bank consumer lenders (the sarakin and yenya of Japanese news media).
Thus, the most notable effect of the prohibition has been to shift borrowers from the most
heavily regulated and responsible lenders to the least regulated and responsible.48 To be
sure, if one believed that existing insolvency procedures are systematically too lenient,
then a system that permitted people to opt into harsher procedures that involved corporal
abuse or imprisonment could be optimal.49 Although I am convinced of the value of
harsh sanctions in the commercial context,50 I am willing to assume that in all of the
important commercial nations (even the United States), the rigors of consumer
bankruptcy as it currently exists are sufficient to make recourse to extralegal enforcement
mechanisms suboptimal.
Similarly, American historians suggest that one of the main reasons regulators
pushed for banks to enter the consumer credit market in the 1920’s was to shift consumer
lending from smaller and less reputable lenders to banks, which were thought to be

47

See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55
Vand. L. Rev. 1055 (2002).
48

See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 Texas L. Rev.
681 (2004) (discussing benefits of keeping consumer transactions in the hands of banks rather
than smaller and less reputationally constrained entities).
49

For the classic model of the demand for extralegal enforcement of consumer credit
contracts, see Rea, supra note 15. In his model, the basic problem is moral hazard. Borrowers
agree to harsh consequences to reveal their intention to repay.
50

See Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing
Transactions, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1627 (2001); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in
Financing Transactions, 87 Georgetown L.J. 2225 (1999).
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kinder, gentler, and more reliable conduits for this activity.51 More recently, empirical
evidence about market shifts at the time of credit card rate deregulation in the United
States in the early 1980’s shows significantly different rates of shifts from finance
companies to credit card lenders based on the nature of rate regulation.52 Finally, the
history of consumer mortgage lending in both Canada and the UK shows a massive shift
of the market to – and from – banks based on regulations that permit – or prohibit – banks
from issuing consumer mortgages at market rates.53
One possible response would be to solve the problem of shifting by adopting a
much broader usury regulation. In Japan, for example, if regulators wished to restrict
credit entirely rather than simply allocate the profitable lending to finance companies,
they could simply apply usury limits without exceptions, so that all kinds of lending
transactions would be covered. It is not clear, of course, what effect that would have on
lending that depends explicitly on extralegal methods of enforcement, a market that
experience suggests will be significant wherever usury laws are relied on heavily.
More practically, the heterogeneity of consumer credit products and markets
makes it likely that any broad-brush response would run headlong into the bluntness
problem discussed above. For example, market interest rates on payday loans in the
United States commonly are in the range of 500%.54 We might accept the fact that a risk

51

Harold van B. Cleveland, CitiBank: 1812-1970 (1986); James Grant, Money of the
Mind: Borrowing and Lending in America from the Civil War to Michael Milken (1992).
52

Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation, 3
Yale J. on Regulation 201 (1986).
53

See Ackrill & Hannah, supra note 39; Duncan McDowall, Quick to the Frontier:
Canada’s Royal Bank (1993).
54

See Peterson, supra note 14.
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premium would justify doubling or tripling the rate that a creditworthy borrower would
pay, but rates like these – dozens of multiples of market rates – at first glance suggest a
wholly abusive market. The difficulty, however, is that an obvious reason for those rates
is the relatively small size of the transactions in question. If we suppose that there are
fixed costs in administering any lending transaction,55 then as the size of the transaction
approaches zero, the rate that would cover the cost of funds, risk of loss, and transaction
costs would become asymptotically high.
I do not intend to suggest that the markets for payday lending are well functioning
or that the rates are low. I do think, however, that the rise of national publicly traded
payday lenders suggests that the market is becoming much more competitive, at least in
those jurisdictions that have usury ceilings sufficiently high to permit those firms to
operate profitably.56 What little comparative evidence we have (government reports
issued in the UK in the last few years) suggests that consumers respond quite rationally to
the differences in major lending products available to them.57

Predictably enough, the

evidence shows that consumers perceive there to be a spectrum from relatively
disadvantageous products (like rent-to-own suppliers and pawnbrokers) to relatively
benevolent products like payday loans. A comparative study of current markets suggests,
as you might expect, that consumers use the relatively disadvantageous products only in

55

DeMuth, supra note 52, at 228, reports a Federal Reserve study indicating that about
60% of the costs of consumer lending are administrative costs unrelated to the cost of funds. For
a detailed discussion of this problem in the UK, see Griffiths Commission, 2005 Report, supra
note 37.
56

See Robert Elder, Payday Lenders Banking on New State Law, Austin
American Statesman, Apr. 22, 2005.
57

DTI Report, supra note 42; Griffiths Commission, 2005 Report, supra note 37.
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areas in which regulatory authorities have foreclosed opportunities for the relatively
benevolent ones.58 Thus, we might think, for example, that rules that relaxed restrictions
sufficiently to permit a competitive market for payday lenders ultimately would benefit
consumers by giving them a sufficient supply in that market to forestall their use of more
onerous rent-to-own products.
The point of this discussion is to suggest that regulators will need to have a
sophisticated sense of the on-the-ground value and cost structure of the various products
that they are regulating to design usury regulations that will not be counter-productive.
The difficulty of that problem convinces me that the bluntness implications of any
sensible set of ceilings will be serious.
*****
Thus, given the difficulties of separating value-increasing transactions from
value-diminishing transactions, I am skeptical about the value of usury regulations as a
general policy tool.59 This is not to say that a high ceiling might not be appropriate.
Such a ceiling would have the salutary effect of prohibiting transactions at rates
sufficiently high to suggest a lack of engaged consent by the borrower. Thus, they might
have a targeted effect on various classes of subprime lending markets. They would not,
however, provide a substantial response to the overindebtedness problem on which I
focus here.

58

See DTI Report, supra note 42.

59

UK policymakers in the last few years have rejected interest rate caps after a series of
detailed studies of subprime lending markets convinced most of those involved that caps would
do more harm than good. DTI Report, supra note 42; Griffiths Commission, 2005 Report, supra
note 37.
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B.

Minimum Payments
Another approach would be to impose rules that require lenders of certain types to

impose a certain minimum payment amount each month. For example, Britain formerly
had a rule requiring cardholders to repay 15% of their credit card debt each month.60
Even American regulators, acting through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (an interagency group that oversees standards for federal examination of
financial institutions), have issued a recent “guidance” suggesting that lenders should not
permit negative amortization and should require repayment in a “reasonable” time.61
Although targeted primarily to the subprime lending market, the annual reports of major
American card issuers suggest that the guidance has had an important effect on their
lending practices.62
One systematic advantage of that kind of approach is that it does not directly
prohibit any value-increasing transaction. Borrowers that believe they have uses of funds
that exceed the market interest rates are free to borrower them from lenders that believe
the borrowers are sufficiently creditworthy. Of course, that raises the converse question
whether there is any reason to think that such proposals would be beneficial. Although I

60

Margaret Ackrill & Leslie Hannah, Barclay’s: The Business of Banking 1690-1996
(2001); The Plastic-Money Would-Be Pre-Election Boom, The Economist, Sept. 9, 1978, at 107
(discussing rule imposed in 1973 and lifted in 1978).
61

The
Federal
Reserve
press
release
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030108/ .
62

is

at

MBNA reports, for example, that it has changed its standard procedure from requiring
a repayment of 2.25% (a shade above the interest accruing at 18% each month) to a requirement
that each borrower repay 1% of the principal each month in addition to all interest and fees. This
is not a requirement that each borrower repay its bill in 100 months. As described in the annual
report, a borrower that made the minimum payments under that plan, and never made any future
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am not convinced the proposals would make a major change, they do seem to me
reasonably likely to be beneficial, for two interrelated reasons.
First, and most importantly, there is some likelihood that people in financial
distress will not be able to make the payments, and thus will default and fall into
bankruptcy sooner rather than later. This would be beneficial if (as knowledgeable
writers generally assume), consumer borrowers often defer bankruptcy filings too long.63
The idea is that if we can cause lenders to cut the borrowers off sooner the externalities of
financial distress will diminish. In case it is not clear from the discussion above, the
reason that we cannot rely on the lender to make the appropriate judgment on that point –
the lender, after all, loses in each case in which the borrower does not repay – is that the
lender does not bear all of the losses of the customer’s financial distress. Third parties
bear a substantial portion of those losses, giving the lender an inadequate incentive to set
payment plans that will minimize the total costs of financial distress.
The second effect is less objective, and certainly is related to the first, but focuses
more on the nature of the loan that is being extended. When lenders extend closed-end
installment loans to fund the purchase of specific commodities, they generally set
repayment schedules that mirror the useful live of the subject property. In that model, the
lending and purchase go hand in hand in disciplining the borrower’s adherence to a
budget that matches expenditures (on loan repayments) with the borrower’s enjoyment of

purchases, would never repay the outstanding debt, because the minimum payment would decline
steadily as the outstanding balance declined. See MBNA 2004 Annual Report at 33.
63

See Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7 (discussing that problem in the context of
a ban on universal default rules).
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the useful life of the object.64 When the loan instead is extended for daily purchases, the
enjoyment of which is completed in days or weeks, with repayment deferred for months
or decades, we have created a loan that bears no relation to the useful life of the
purchases.

This is not the place, and I am not the writer, to examine all of the

implications of that shift. Yet one relevant implication certainly is the possibility that
such loans will have a systematically higher likelihood of default. If that is so, those
loans may be more likely to produce external costs than more conventional loans. A
natural minimalist response, then, might be to adopt a rule that open-ended lending must
have repayment schedules that, at the outside, would amortize a loan within 60 months
(the long end of the typical range of fully amortizing loans for personal property).
It is difficult to be sure, that such a rule would have important effects. But I
would not recommend it if the early evidence did not suggest that even the feeble
guidance recently issued by American regulators has had cognizable market effects
parallel to the ones that I discuss.65 In sum, this reform would not solve the problem.
Nevertheless, it certainly appears likely to move things in the right direction.

64

This is the point of the “budgetism” that is a prominent theme in Lendol Calder,
Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Secured Credit (1999).
65

See, e.g., Bank of America 2004 Annual Report 30, 35, 43, 69 (noting an increase in
chargeoffs and provisions for losses on credit card lending because of the change): Citigroup
2004 Annual Report 55 (predicting increased losses and delinquencies because of the change);
JPMorgan Chase 2004 Annual Report 21 (predicting that the change will cause increased
delinquency and chargeoff rates).
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C.

Taxing Distressed Debt
The discussion above leads naturally to a more targeted solution: a tax on

distressed debt, and in particular a tax on defaulted credit card obligations.66 A tax that is
imposed on debt that has gone into default is much more carefully tailored to the
transactions that are likely to impose externalities than a usury regulation. It will not
cover any transaction in which the benefits that the borrower receives from the lending
transaction turn out to be adequate to facilitate repayment.67 And it responds to the
problem more directly than an alteration in minimum payment requirements, because it
directly internalizes upon one of the parties to the transaction some of the externalities
that the transaction currently shifts to those not party to the transaction.
To the extent that such a tax increases the ex ante price of credit in the relative
markets, that seems to me an appropriate outcome.

Given the rapidly developing

segmentation of risk pools, we would expect such a tax to lead to a surcharge of varying
sizes based on the anticipated riskiness of the borrower. High quality (high FICO score)
borrowers would pay little or no surcharge; low quality (low FICO score) borrowers
would pay a much higher surcharge.68 From a broader perspective, a surcharge is simply

66

This idea is derived from a tax on defaulted credit obligations that is part of the new
Belgic bankruptcy system. See Kilborn, Belgium and Luxembourg, supra note 4.
67

Compared to usury regulation, this tax also has the important benefit that it probably
could be applied to national banks without risk of preemption or evasion under the National Bank
Act, something that is not true for usury regulations. Mark Furletti, The Debate over the National
Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards (Fed. Res. Bank of
Philadelphia, Payment Cards Center, Discussion Paper) (March 2004).
68

I use that specific example of segmentation because Furletti’s data indicates that
segmentation of borrowing pools by FICO scores provides a useful benchmark for the rapidly
increasing differentiation of interest rates within a single creditor’s portfolio. Furletti, supra note
42.
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a shift between the parties to the transaction of the costs that the parties presently are
jointly externalizing.
To be sure, the tax is likely to cause a contraction of lending to distressed
borrowers, as credit card issuers attempt to avoid growth in their portfolio of distressed
debt, or an acceleration of the time when those borrowers file for bankruptcy. For
reasons discussed above, I also find that possibility appealing, because it is likely to cause
borrowers to file for bankruptcy earlier in their downward spiral.

The dominant

consensus within the body of literature that has examined empirical data about the
condition of consumer borrowers by the time they file for bankruptcy is that the existing
system generally causes consumer borrowers to file for bankruptcy too late, when an
earlier filing might have solved problems with lower total costs.69

IV. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY POLICY
From one perspective, it makes no sense to view consumer bankruptcy policy as a
separate topic at all. If the bankruptcy system is part of the social safety net, then we
should think about bankruptcy policy alongside health-care policy, insurance policy,
entrepreneurial policy, and the like.70 Recognizing that there is some truth to that point in
an ideal world, it continues to be the case that bankruptcy policy in fact is largely made
against the backdrop of its relation to the consumer finance markets. Thus, this part of
the essay considers bankruptcy policy in relative isolation, as it relates to the finance

69

See supra note 63.

70

The original source on that point as a matter of theory is Jackson, supra note 3. For a
broader discussion founded on empirical investigation, see Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra
note 4.
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markets. As the discussion below suggests, my view is that plenty of work remains to be
done in upgrading the state of analysis even in that relatively contained milieu. If we
could produce a sound understanding of that subject, that should form a basis for
considering the extent to which other major policy imperatives (like health care and
social security) should influence (or be influenced by) the reality of bankruptcy and
financial distress.
A.

Bankruptcy Theory
When we come to bankruptcy rules as a policy lever for minimizing the

externalities of excessive borrowing, we confront a substantial economics literature about
what type of discharge would have the optimal effect on credit markets. The general
problem is that bankruptcy law must balance the protection of creditors, which promotes
the availability and inexpensive provision of credit, against the protection of debtors,
which prevents overindebtedness and underscreening by banks.

Thus, strong legal

protection of creditors may be efficient ex ante, but create inefficiencies ex post. For
example, Tom Jackson argued two decades ago that basic economic principles called for
a relatively unhindered fresh start to prevent the losses society bears when individuals
become irretrievably enmeshed in financial distress.71
Recent literature has focused on various ways in which a less generous
bankruptcy system might improve the incentives of consumer borrowers. The Adler,
Polak Schwartz (APS) model, for example, suggests that an optimal market would solve
moral hazard problems by permitting consumer borrowers to waive their bankruptcy

71

Jackson, supra note 3.
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remedies by contract.

Similarly, much of Michelle White’s research has at least

implicitly suggested that exemptions that preserve any substantial asset base for
consumer bankrupts will give undue incentives that will cause consumers to file for
bankruptcy without adequate financial distress to justify the discharge that they will
receive.72
Even on their own terms, that work seems to provide little support for increasing
the rigor of the bankruptcy system. Most obviously, the APS model specifically assumes
that the parties to a borrowing transaction internalize all costs of financial distress.
Essentially, their paper suggests that we should permit contracting out of bankruptcy
because in a world where bankruptcy is partly endogenous – within the borrower'
s
control – that contract will allow borrowers to sort themselves and precommit to avoid
moral hazard. Obviously, if bankruptcy is largely exogenous or attributable in part to
quasi-rational behavior, as I argue above, then the significance of this effect fades.
Again, what we know about the reality of bankruptcy in this country73 and in the UK74
suggests that a great deal, if not the overwhelming majority, of bankruptcy is exogenous.
Similarly, as discussed above, Michelle White’s own work suggests a variety of empirical

72

E.g., White, Why Don’t More Households File?, supra note 27; White, Why It Pays,
supra note 27.
73

The basic argument of the work of Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook generally is that
bankruptcy for the most part is exogenous. E.g., Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 18;
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 4; Warren & Tyagi, supra note 14. My research on
credit cards lends cross-border support to that view. Mann, Cards Data, supra note 9.
74

The Griffiths Commission Report argues that consumer bankruptcy in the UK (where
total household indebtedness is even higher than it is in the USA) generally follows upon a
“trigger” (such as loss of a job or change in family circumstances) followed by a “spiral” into
debt that cannot be repaid. Griffiths Commission, 2005 Report, supra note 37. The Griffiths
Commission Report is particularly interesting because it offers a rare glance at what seems to be
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scenarios in which it would be counterproductive to lower the ability of bankrupts to
protect post-bankruptcy earnings.75
It is important, however, to think about the problem more broadly. Explicitly or
implicitly, all of the existing literature rests on the assumption that borrowers are better
situated than lenders to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy.76 That view might have
made sense in a traditional bank lending model, where a borrower comes to a bank, sits in
the banker’s office, executes loan documents, receives funds, and is then free to go –
unconstrained in any realistic way from later activities that might reduce the likelihood
that the borrower will be able to repay the loan. In that model, for example, the bank is
unable effectively to prevent the borrower from engaging in reckless future borrowing or
wasting the borrowed funds on frivolous luxuries.
In the modern information-based lending world, however, it is much less
plausible to view the borrowers as operating in full control to the detriment of hapless
and incapable lenders. Most obviously, the modern lender (at least in this country) has
access to pervasive and frequently updated information about the credit behavior of its
customers.77 For example, the modern credit-card lender has the ability to terminate the
borrower’s use of funds at any time by the simple expedient of refusing to permit
additional uses of the card once the information available to the lender indicates that the

reliable household-level information about consumer credit, helping us to understand into how
small a share of the nation’s households the average amount of outstanding credit is compacted.
75

White, A General Model, supra note 2.

76

E.g., Jackson, supra note 3; Adler, Polak & Schwartz, supra note 1.

77

The idea is not a new one. For example, writing in 1985, Jackson presciently
acknowledged the possibility that experienced lenders might develop the ability to monitor
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borrower’s behavior is insufficiently creditworthy. On that point, the rise of credit
bureaus largely has solved the problem of multiple non-adjusting lenders harming each
other’s prospects without either aware of the others.
In sum, in the modern world, particularly in the context of credit card lending, the
rate of default in a lender’s portfolio is largely in the control of the lender. If a lender
wishes to lower the rate of default in its portfolio, it can simply tighten the criteria it uses
for determining when to cease advancing.78 That tightening, of course, might not be
profitable if it lowers the revenue the lender gains from loans to risky borrowers. Yet all
that means is that modern lenders are optimizing their default rates in their own portfolios
– balancing default losses against profits from loans to the less creditworthy potential
consumers.79
Once we recognize that they are optimizing the risk of default from a private
perspective that takes no account of the externalities financial distress displaces to third
parties, we have a problem that warrants the attention of policymakers. A glance at some
illustrative statistics about the credit card industry is useful. Under the conventional
model, increasing delinquency rates by cardholders translate directly into a loss by the

borrowing more adeptly than borrowers. Jackson, supra note 3, at 1400; see Eisenberg,
Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 976-91 (1981).
78

As a glance at any annual report for a monoline credit card issuer will show, this is an
oversimplification. Delinquencies on credit card accounts show a distinct time trend as the
portfolio ages, so much of the science of managing delinquency and charge-off rates involves
management over time of classes of accounts of differing ages and risk profiles. See, for
example, Providian’s discussion of its carefully implemented efforts to lower the delinquency rate
in its portfolio since 2001 by shifting to higher quality borrowers. Providian 2004 Annual Report
3-5.
79

As Tom Jackson noted twenty years ago, in comparing the relative ability of borrowers
and lenders to bear risks, consumer borrowers (unlike, perhaps, publicly traded corporations) are
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card issuers, which translates directly into increased charges borne by the cardholders
that repay.80 In a world in which lenders are optimizing default rates and externalizing
losses to other parties, increased delinquency rates do not necessarily suggest that lenders
should raise prices and lower output. On the contrary, to the modern credit card lender,
increased delinquency rates suggest a greater number of borrowers likely to have an
appetite for carrying balances at a level that is profitable for the lenders. To get a sense
for the reality of the relations, consider Figure One, which sets out charge-offs and
outstandings for the ten largest credit card banks over the last decade. As that figure
shows, chargeoffs have been rising steadily throughout the last decade, but there is no
discernible evidence that the leading lenders have cut back their lending; rather their
portfolio seems to have grown in lockstep with the growth in charge-offs. Nor should we
think that lenders have reacted to the increasing chargeoffs by imposing substantial
increases in their interest rates. On the contrary, as shown in Figure Two, interest rates
over the same period of time have fallen steadily (slightly, but steadily).

much less able to diversify the risk of financial distress than lenders. Jackson, supra note 3, at
1400.
80

See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. Bankr. L. & Pr. (2004) (describing that
conventional syllogism and the implausibility of the notion that the increased charges amount to
$400 per year per family).
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FIGURE ONE: LOSSES AND LENDING

Source: Nilson Report 829
FIGURE TWO: AVERAGE CREDIT CARD MARKUP

Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19.
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This is not to suggest, of course, that borrowers have no control over default. Of
course they do. The appropriate policy question, however, is whether they are the only
party that is in a position to limit the social losses of financial distress. If both borrowers
and lenders are in a position to take steps to limit those losses, then we should be asking
how to allocate incentives between those two parties to minimize the net externalized
costs of financial distress. We can trust the parties themselves to minimize the costs they
bear between themselves, but not the losses others suffer.
Thus, to consider an analogy to payments policy, this is much like allocating
losses from fraudulent use of credit cards. If all of the losses are placed on banks, they
will have an incentive to use information technology to prevent those losses, but we
might fear that cardholders will have inadequate incentives to take commonsense
precautions to avoid theft of their card or card number. Currently, our legal system
operates on the assumption that the hassle and inconvenience of card loss gives adequate
incentive to cardholders, so the out-of-pocket losses from fraud are placed almost entirely
on the card issuers.81
In this context, a perspective that views the experience of consumer bankruptcy as
a time for celebration and reveling by the released borrowers would worry that only a
truly unforgiving bankruptcy system – or perhaps penal confinement – would be adequate
to prevent widespread fraud.82 In contrast, a perspective that views consumer bankruptcy

81

Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 Geo.
L.J. 633 (2005).
82

I discern such a perspective in Zywicki, Testimony, supra note 16, and LoPucki, supra
note 19. The instinct that harsh punishment is necessary calls to mind the cadena temporal
condemned as cruel by the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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– even in the United States in the 21st century – as a deeply humiliating and scarring
personal experience would think that the event of bankruptcy alone gives a substantial
protection against moral hazard, and that judges could be relied on to identify cases of
overt misconduct. That perspective would shift as much of the monetary losses as
possible to lenders, and in particular to adjusting lenders that can control financial
distress through the ability to terminate the borrower’s ability to obtain future funds.
It is not my purpose here to make detailed policy prescriptions. Generally, the
analysis suggests that subordination of the debt of controlling, adjusting creditors would
be an appropriate response. As a practical matter in the United States, that suggests
special rules that would subordinate the recoveries of credit card lenders to the recoveries
of other general unsecured creditors. My general impression, however, is that such a rule
would have a relatively minor impact, because of the large number of no-asset cases in
which even general unsecured creditors would receive nothing. Thus, I am inclined to
think that such a rule would make sense only as an adjunct to a tax on distressed debt of
the kind that I discuss in the previous part of this essay.
B.

Bankruptcy “Reform”
Against that backdrop, it seems worthwhile to consider the likely effects of the

recently adopted Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.83

83

After struggling with bankruptcy reform for 8 years, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 in April 2005, and President Bush
signed the Act a few days later. The Act substantially amends the bankruptcy laws of the United
States and will have its greatest impact in consumer bankruptcy cases. The legislation relating to
consumer bankruptcy will make it more difficult for individuals to seek relief under chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Among other changes, the Act imposes on consumer debtors who are
above the median income a complex mathematical “means testing” formula to determine whether
the case should be dismissed for an abuse of chapter 7. The Act also will require the payment of
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Recognizing that it is too early to know how the reforms will play out in practice, it is
fair, however, to examine the policy motivations that are apparent on the face of the
statute to see how they compare to the policy recommendations and theoretical
frameworks that I summarize above. As a general matter, the revisions reflect acceptance
of the premise that the primary empirical link of policy significance is that generous
bankruptcy relief tends to increase the demand for credit but lower the incentive to repay,
so that more rigorous bankruptcy relief would lead to higher repayment rates and thus
lower interest rates. But even that rationale can do little to justify the statute as written.
Taken seriously, that premise would suggest that the reforms should apply only to newly
incurred obligations, for which interest rates presumably would be lower. Permitting
lenders to use the relatively rigorous collection incentives of the new act to collect on
debts already incurred under preexisting contracts seems like a windfall from an incentive
perspective.
Turning to the substance of the reforms, my blunt view is that the reforms related
to consumer bankruptcy seem likely to have effects directly opposed to those suggested
by the analysis above. I focus on three separate points: the practical limitations on the
use of Chapter 7, the practical elevation of the priority of credit card lenders, and the
likelihood that the reforms as a whole will lead to later filings by distressed consumers.
The first problem is the one most apparent from the immediately preceding
paragraphs, the portion of the reforms that is specifically designed to force consumers out
of Chapter 7 and into Chapter 13, with a view to limiting the ability of bankrupts to

greater amounts under a chapter 13 plan for many consumer debtors and will alter provisions on
exempt assets, reaffirmation of debts, and discharge of indebtedness for individuals.
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discharge debts while earning a substantial post-discharge income. Quite apart from any
concerns about the administrative practicality or utility of the provisions, as a matter of
basic theory they seem incongruous in light of the discussion above.

My analysis

suggests that the system should increase the incentive of lenders to take steps to minimize
the costs of financial distress that those transactions externalize. Yet these revisions in
contrast are designed explicitly to shift the costs of financial distress to the borrower.84
Second, if the general effect of the reforms is to lessen the benefits of bankruptcy,
they well may cause some distressed borrowers to defer their bankruptcy filings.85 As
discussed above, what we know about consumer bankruptcy as it currently exists is that
consumer borrowers probably file too late, not too early. These reforms are likely only to
exacerbate that problem. The proposals that I discuss above, by contrast, are likely to
cause people to file sooner by limiting the economic incentive of credit card issuers to
continue lending.86
Finally, to some degree the revisions are likely to elevate the likelihood that credit
card lenders will be repaid in bankruptcy above the likelihood that other unsecured

84

Another remarkable aspect of the reforms relates to the distinction between businessrelated consumer borrowing and spending-related borrowing. One thing that the revisions did not
do is alter the provisions in Bankruptcy Code § 707 that limit the chapter-shifting rules to those
with “primarily consumer debts.” Thus, the chapter-shifting rules by the terms will not affect
individuals who have incurred debts for business purposes. The empirical evidence discussed
above does suggest good reasons for the treatment of business-related lending. Still, however,
there is considerable insincerity in the juxtaposition of the public policy to encourage that
borrowing (and the related spending) and the subsequent harsh treatment of that borrowing in
bankruptcy.
85

It is not clear to me that the reforms will result in a substantial lessening of total filings.
If filings are almost entirely attributable to serious distress, as seems likely, then the likely effect
will only be a deferral, which would be evidenced by a short-term downturn in filings.
86

In Mann, Global Cards Policy, supra note 7, I propose banning the use of universal
default provisions for similar reasons.
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creditors will be repaid.87 Any such policy has a number of obvious adverse
consequences. First, most obviously, credit card lenders88 are more able to adjust to
evidence of distress than other unsecured creditors.89 So, for example, provisions that
make more credit card debts nondischargeable place those lenders on an even playing
field with child support and alimony claimants. Because the bill does nothing to increase
the assets in bankruptcy estates, those claimants will be harmed even with enhanced
priority positions in bankruptcy.

The discussion above suggests that an optimal

bankruptcy/finance policy would be searching for ways to increase the incentives of
adjusting creditors with the ability to control their borrowers. If credit card lenders are
the plainest examples of such a lender, and if credit card lenders also are the group whose

87

The principal example here is § 310, which revises Bankruptcy Code § 523 to broaden
the types of credit card debt that are presumptively not dischargeable. Among other things, any
cash advance of more than $750 will raise that presumption. So, for example, if a borrower less
than 90 days before bankruptcy obtains a cash advance to pay rent or a medical bill or to shift
balances from one credit card to another, the previously dischargeable debt now will become
presumptively nondischargeable. It is difficult to know how serious that problem is. One UK
agency estimates that borrowing money from one creditor to pay off another is a common
practice in half of households suffering from financial distress. Griffiths Commission, 2005
Report, supra note 37.
88

It is perhaps most notable that a variety of statutes that might have limited the
prerogatives of credit card lenders or remedied more serious abuses in the process received little
serious attention from Congress. Consider, for example, Credit CARD Act of 2005, S. 499, 109th
Cong. (prohibiting various credit card practices, enhancing disclosures, and the like); Bankruptcy
Fairness Act, S. 329, 109th Cong. (increasing priority claims for nonadjusting creditors);
Billionaire’s Loophole Elimination Act, H.R. 1278, 109th Cong. (limiting protection for asset
protection trusts); Medical Bills Interest Rate Relief Act, H.R. 1238, 109th Cong. (amending
TILA with respect to credit card transactions related to medical bills).
89

As discussed above, the economics of the current situation give lenders an incentive to
manage their lending in a way that optimizes the results of their entire portfolio, which might lead
in many cases to greater amounts of lending at higher rates with less individualized assessments
of particular loans. I am generally skeptical of reforms (like the EU’s responsible lending
initiative) that attempt to specify rules for lending; discussion of that topic in the annual reports of
credit card issuers makes me doubt the ability of regulators to perform that task effectively. A
more appropriate response, I think, is to alter the system so that the issuers designing their
underwriting policies will internalize more of the costs of the distress that arises from their loans,
and thus figure out the most sophisticated methods for lending less riskily.
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lending most directly promises to create externalities of financial distress, then reforms
should go in the opposite direction. Any reform that transfers value from nonadjusting
creditors to adjusting creditors only exacerbates the externalities of the bankruptcy
process by imposing losses on those that have not had an opportunity to spread them over
a mass of voluntarily priced transactions. Thus, it would make much more sense to
expand the category of priority unsecured claims to include more comprehensively the
categories of nonadjusting creditors that currently share priority with adjusting credit card
lenders. The revisions that directly benefit credit card lenders might be slight in effect,
but still reflect a move in the wrong direction.90

V. CONCLUSION
History teaches us that a country that is committed to tolerating consumer
spending as an engine of broader economic growth must provide some safety valve for
the distress of those who do not succeed in the market economy. As our theories of those
markets become more nuanced, and as our understanding of the empirical reality
becomes clearer, the time has come when we are in a position to design policies that have
a real prospect of cushioning the fall of those in distress and limiting the burdens their
distress imposes on the rest of us.
Thus, I propose two principal alterations in the way we think about credit and
bankruptcy institutions. First, the link between credit card spending and financial distress

90

Indeed, the only significant “reform” with regard to lending industry disclosure is the
requirement that credit card companies provide the consumer with an “800" number to call and
unrealistic examples of credit card debt paydowns (which may not reflect the actual situation of
the debtor and thus prove misleading), as well as a series of boilerplate warnings regarding real
estate loans and teaser rates.
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suggests payment systems reforms designed to curtail the instrument-induced risk and
credit market reforms designed to internalize the costs of financial distress to the
transacting parties. Here I suggest rules that would increase the minimum repayments on
credit card loans and tax distressed debt held by credit card issuers. Second, I suggest
that there is little evidence that the American “fresh start” bankruptcy system has
imposed any substantial “bankruptcy tax” on responsible debtors in this country over the
past 25 years, so that reforms premised on concerns about stigma or the robustness of
credit markets should give way to the realities of tolerating (indeed encouraging) risky
behavior by consumers and entrepreneurs alike.
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